On June 28, 2024, the Supreme Court issued a landmark decision in the case of Loper Bright Enterprises et al. v. Raimondo, Secretary Of Commerce, et al., No. 22–451, effectively ending the Chevron doctrine. This decision is poised to reshape the balance of power among the three branches of American government—particularly between the executive and judicial branches—for generations to come.
The Loper Bright case arose from a family-run fishing business in the North Atlantic that was mandated by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) to pay fees up to $710 per day, for federal observers aboard its vessels. These observers ensure compliance with various fishing industry laws and limits. Notably, the applicable statute does not explicitly require such fees for businesses like Loper Bright; it only mentions foreign vessels, limited access vessels, and vessels in the North Pacific. Nevertheless, NMFS applied the statute’s requirements to North Atlantic vessels as well.
For the past 40 years, the Supreme Court’s Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Resources Defense Council, 467 U. S. 837 (1984) decision would have concluded this case. The Chevron doctrine established “deference” to governmental agencies, meaning courts must defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute if the statute is silent or ambiguous and the agency’s interpretation is permissible. Loper Bright faced this deference at both the trial and circuit court levels, with courts refusing to challenge NMFS’s interpretation.
However, the Supreme Court’s recent 6-3 decision, written by Chief Justice Roberts, invoked the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 1946, asserting that courts must interpret statutory provisions and determine the applicability of administrative actions. Chief Justice Roberts deemed the Chevron doctrine “fundamentally misguided” and “unworkable” within the APA’s framework. He emphasized that “Chevron defies the command of the APA that ‘the reviewing court’—not the agency whose action it reviews—is to ‘decide all relevant questions of law’ and ‘interpret . . . statutory provisions.’” The Court concluded that while courts may consider an agency’s interpretation of a statute, they are no longer required to defer to it as under Chevron. Courts must now independently determine whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority. However, the Court noted that lower courts must still defer to agencies if a statute clearly delegates authority, though it did not define what constitutes “clear” delegation. Additionally, a carve-out protects cases previously decided under Chevron.
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